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The development of social protection 






Tanzania has recently scaled up a piloted conditional cash transfer programme to 
target the extreme poor across the country. In addition, there has been moves to 
finalise a national social protection framework and the possibility of introducing an 
old age pension has been announced. This paper focuses on these three main social 
protection developments in Tanzania and looks into the role of different 
bureaucracies and their funding partners in shaping social protection policies. The 
Tanzanian case illustrates how external agencies influence the development of social 
protection strategies in low-income countries. Although policy ownership lies with 
domestic institutions, their ability to develop policies, implement these and document 
their success is largely depended on the support they get from external agencies. By 
funding pilot projects and supporting evidence-based publications and promotional 
events, external actors can play a determining role in promoting specific social 
protection policy designs. Without strong institutional ownership with the backing of 






Social protection on mainland Tanzania has long been a low priority.1 Being a low-
income country, Tanzania has high levels of deprivation and high demand for income 
security, but limited resources to address these issues. Nevertheless, in the past few 
years, there have been some substantial moves towards developing social protection 
policies. In 2013, the government approved the implementation of the Productive 
Social Safety Net (PSSN) programme, which is a nation-wide conditional cash 
transfer programme that targets the extreme poor population. During 2014 and 2015, 
there were moves to finalise a National Social Protection Framework (NSPF) and the 
																																								 																				
1 Tanzania is a union between the Mainland and the Zanzibar islands. As social protection is not a 
union matter but falls under the jurisdiction of the two regions, the paper only focuses on social 




possibility of introducing an old age pension was announced. However, the NSPF 
did not get enacted by government and no actual committed starting date for the 
pension was confirmed by the time the national elections came in October 2015, and 
consequently, the fate of the NSPF and the old age pension are still uncertain.2 
 
Despite these delays, Tanzania has nevertheless taken some initial steps towards 
expanding its social protection coverage (albeit from a very low starting point). In 
this paper, I look into the development of these three social protection polices - the 
National Social Protection Framework, the old age pension, and the conditional cash 
transfer programme. In presenting a historical narrative starting in 2000, I explore 
which actors have promoted the different policies and why.  
 
The analysis focuses on the role of the different bureaucratic agencies responsible 
for social protection and the international development partners supporting the 
government and its bureaucratic institutions. Through interviews with these 
stakeholders and the readings of available documents, it becomes clear that there has 
not been an overall coherent strategy for social protection reform. Rather, the policies 
have developed through an incremental process where different stakeholders have 
had distinct interests, resources and abilities to promote their favoured policy 
options. The World Bank, together with its implementing partner TASAF and the 
Ministry of Finance, has been particularly successful in promoting the conditional 
cash transfer programme, which is now in the process of being expanded nation-
wide. International NGOs, the ILO, and the Ministry of Labour, which have been 
less resourceful compared to the stakeholders promoting the conditional cash 
transfer, have sought to promote the old age pension. The development of the 
National Social Protection Framework have been stalled several times, which can 
partly be explained by the challenges of dividing institutional responsibility across 
competing ministries. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: first, the extent of poverty and income insecurity 
in Tanzania is described and a brief overview of past social protection policies is 
provided. Then, the overall policy framework and approach to development by the 
government is outlined. The next three sections analyse the three main recent social 
protection policies as they have developed, focusing on the national social protection 
framework, the old age pension and the conditional cash transfer programmes 
respectively. The conclusion draws together the main lessons from the analyses as 
they have relevance to social protection theories and actual developments across 
Africa. 
																																								 																				




2. Income security in Tanzania 
 
At the turn to the new Millennium, social protection for poor and vulnerable groups 
in Tanzania was woefully inadequate. A few programmes existed. There were for 
instance programmes that targeted vulnerable children through advocating children’s 
rights, improving their access to basic services and providing assistance to orphans. 
There were also credit schemes and some counselling and assistance for needy 
women and people with disabilities (Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003). Emergency 
food aid programmes were also in place to provide temporary assistance for 
particularly vulnerable groups (poor households in periods of food shortage and 
refugees) (World Bank, 2011). Nevertheless, common for the variety of programmes 
was that they were small scale, covering only specific geographical areas or moments 
(e.g. times of poor harvest), and primarily externally funded. Although a few 
programmes were implemented by government bodies, the majority were run by 
(international) non-governmental organisations. A general lack of financial resources 
and capacity both within government and civil society were compounding factors, 
but a “lack of political will” also explains the state’s “failure to provide adequate 
social protection to the poor” (Mchomvu, Tungaraza & Maghimbi, 2002: 19; Lerisse, 
Mmari & Baruani, 2003). 
 
Tanzania is a low-income country with a GDP per capita income of US$ 1,334 and 
among the poorest in Africa. Despite consistent annual growth rates of above 6 
percent since 2001, poverty levels have remained stubbornly high (Malik & UNDP, 
2013). Throughout the 2000s roughly a third of the population (34.4 percent) were 
estimated to live below the poverty line. According to the recent Household Survey 
of 2011/12, official poverty levels have now dropped to 28.2 percent, which then 
constitute the first significant decline in poverty in 20 years (World Bank, 2015). 
While this figure does indicate a decline in poverty incidences, caution must be taken 
in comparing with past poverty figures as poverty estimations methodologies have 
changed. In absolute terms, at least 12 million Tanzanians live below the poverty 
line, which is the same number as in 2001 (World Bank, 2015; Morisset, 2013b).  
 
The official poverty line gives a sense of the extent of severe deprivation. However, 
the majority of Tanzanians are income insecure. Although, some might succeed in 
moving above the poverty line, many are equally prone to fall (back) below the line; 
that is “a large share of the population hovers around the poverty line” (World Bank, 
2015: 18). Using a different indicator of poverty (population living below US$1.25 
a day) the poor population of Tanzania amounts to 43.5 percent of the total 




the economically active population have paid jobs with the government, parastatals 
and private employers (Osberg & Bandara, 2012: 9); jobs that may have some social 
insurance benefits attached to them. In general, the supply exceeds demands in the 
wage labour market and the majority of Tanzanians rely on insecure and seasonal 
jobs at low wages. This situation reflects an economy where growth has been 
concentrated in urban areas and in capital-intensive sectors such as construction, 
mining, communication and banking sectors. Growth has lagged behind in the 
agricultural sector – a sector that is characterised by subsistence farming and low 
productivity (Morisset, 2013b; Shepherd et al., 2013: 205).  
 
What is more, the number of households dependent on agriculture has been growing 
(Osberg & Bandara, 2012). The vast majority (around 70 percent) of Tanzanians live 
in rural areas, and the inability to improve the agricultural sector and expand 
economic growth beyond the urban areas is evident in that more than 80 percent of 
the country’s poor reside in rural areas (World Bank, 2015; Morisset, 2013b). Even 
if not defined as poor, living conditions in rural areas are generally dismal: 
 
‘People in rural areas are unlikely to have access to electricity and water; 
are unable to buy essential goods such as soap and clothes; children are 
typically poorly educated, malnourished and unhealthy; malaria is 
endemic and kills tens of thousands of people each year; and one in every 
25 women dies during child-birth. A significant proportion of the rural 
population relies on subsistence agriculture and is highly vulnerable to 
climatic shocks’ (Morisset, 2013b: 27). 
 
Poverty is also an urban phenomenon. However, poverty headcounts in urban areas 
(particularly in the capital city of Dar es Salaam) have consistently been lower than 
in rural areas. Moreover, in Dar es Salaam poverty has declined by more than 70 
percent between 2007 and 2011/12, compared to a decline in rural areas of around 
15 percent (poverty has only decreased slightly by 5 percent in secondary cities and 
towns) (World Bank, 2015).   
 
Thus, it should be clear that “poverty, food insecurity and vulnerability are all ‘mass’ 
phenomena in Tanzania” (Shepherd et al., 2013: 190). In this context of generalised 
insecurity, the need for social protection is immense. However, being a low-income 
country, Tanzania has limited resources and many other developmental challenges 
that compete with social protection. Nonetheless, even compared to other low-
income countries such as Malawi and Ethiopia, Tanzania spends only a tiny amount 
on social transfer programmes aimed at poor and vulnerable groups (0.3 percent of 





One scholar has characterised the social protection framework in Tanzania as an 
“uneasy conjunction of the dwindling remnants of the (older) ex-ante formal social 
insurance schemes (pension and provident funds) with the (newer) ex-post targeted 
social safety-nets which arose in the wage of structural adjustments” (Wuyts, 2006: 
5). Regarding the former, there are six major mandatory social insurance schemes, 
including the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), the National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF) and a number of Pensions and Provident Funds. However, given their 
nature of providing for only those working in secure and well-paid jobs in the formal 
sector, the coverage has been limited to about only 4 percent of the total labour force 
(URT 2008). 
 
With respect to the latter, there is general agreement that the current programmes are 
inadequate, fragmented, uncoordinated, and too limited in scope and coverage 
(Shepherd et al., 2013; World Bank, 2011; URT, 2008). Besides various pilot 
programmes and NGO-funded schemes, there are a few established programmes, 
which are important in their provision of social protection to vulnerable groups. For 
instance, the Ministry of Social Welfare runs a Most Vulnerable Children 
Programme, which as of 2011 has reached annually about 600,000 orphans and other 
vulnerable children through the provision of in-kind transfers such as school 
supplies, clothing and health service cards. Food programmes combined have the 
widest reach. Hence, 1.2 million people have been reached annually through the 
National Food Reserve Agency, which sell grain at subsidised prices during times of 
food shortage; and the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme have been 
benefitting about 1.5 million people annually through the provision of input subsidies 
to farmers growing maize and rice. The two programmes characterise a policy 
response of subsidising goods, which grew out in reaction to the Structural 
Adjustments Programmes in the 1980s; in this way, they are different to ‘newer’ 
social protection policies that provide direct benefits in cash or in kind (Harvey et 
al., 2010). The World Food Programme (WFP) has been running amongst others a 
school feeding scheme and a food-for-assets programme reaching about 200,000 
primarily school children and 54,000 beneficiaries respectively as of 2011 (World 
Bank, 2011). Although this paper focuses on new social protection policy initiatives 
in the past decade (i.e. conditional cash transfer, old age pension and national social 
protection framework), the WFP food-for-asset programme will briefly be discussed 
later as it has some similarities with the public works element of the conditional cash 
transfer programme. 
 
In sum, the majority of Tanzanians have no access to social protection provisions 




Economist in the World Bank Tanzania Office, stated “[w]hen confronted with 
financial distress or some other difficulty, over 80 percent of Tanzanian families say 
they count on relatives and friends for the support needed to get through it” 
(Morisset, 2013a). Nevertheless, in the past few years, Tanzania has taken some 
initial steps towards a more coherent social protection system. The most notable 
recent policy developments are the countrywide roll out of a conditional cash transfer 
programme (now called Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN)), the government’s 
promise to introduce an old age pension, and the development of a national social 
protection framework. In sections 4-6, we explore these three specific policy 
developments, but first we outline the overall policy framework that reflects the 
government’s general approach to development and poverty reduction. 
 
 
3. Overall policy framework 2000-2015 
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) papers often constitute the overall poverty 
framework in many low-income African countries. This has also been the case in 
Tanzania. However, in the past few years, the Tanzanian government has partly 
sidestepped the PRS and instead argued that its Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) 
is the document that defines the government’s approach to development and poverty 
reduction. As elaborated in the following, the FYDP is much less focused on 
protective measures and instead centres on production and pro-poor growth. 
 
In order to qualify for the debt relief initiatives, the Tanzanian government together 
with donors developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy for the years 2000-2003. This 
was followed by two five-year plans: National Strategy for Growth and Reduction 
of Poverty (NSGRP) – also called MKUKUTA I and MKUKUTA II – for the years 
2005-2010 and 2010-2015. Much in line with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and donor priorities for this period, the plans focus on growth, poverty 
reduction, and governance. Thus, both MKUKUTA I and II have three main clusters: 
1) Growth and reduction of income poverty, 2) Quality of life and social well-being, 
and 3) Good governance and accountability. Under the second cluster the provision 
of social services as well as social protection to vulnerable and needy groups feature 
quite prominently. Hence, in MKUKUTA II the operational targets for social 
protection are: i) Proportion of vulnerable children [...], disabled, and eligible adults 
covered with social protection measures increased, and ii) Proportion of eligible 






The MKUKUTA documents are outcomes of government-donor-civil society 
consultations typical for PRSPs. At the insistence of donors, these overall 
development plans have been negotiated through ‘broad consultations’ including 
also civil society organisations. The MKUKUTA documents are argued to largely be 
‘owned’ by Tanzanians and the government that represents them, while being 
supported financially by the donors. The importance of these documents in terms of 
policy planning and implementation are essential as is also evident in government 
budgets where the structures follows the clusters and priorities defined by the 
MKUKUTA (Ministry of Finance 2013). Still, critics have argued that such 
consultations have not been inclusive and that in reality the development of the 
PRSPs, also in Tanzania, has been negotiated by an “iron triangle” of government 
ministries, donor agencies, and international NGOs, which in turn has led to a 
depoliticised and technocratic policy process (Hickey & Bracking, 2005; Kinsella & 
Brehony, 2009; Gould & Ojanen, 2003). 
 
Moreover, although the MKUKUTA is an important policy framework, the 
government introduced in 2011 the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) 
2011/12-2015/16. The government sees the FYDP as the priority document that will 
move the country forward, whereas the MKUKUTA is a supplementary document 
dealing specifically with poverty,3 which is “much to the irritation of some donors, 
who [have] felt that MKUKUTA ought to be the government’s blueprint for 
development” (Tripp, 2012: 16). 
 
Thus, in justifying the introduction of the Five Year Development Plan, it is argued 
in the FYDP-document that with the Government’s Vision 2025 of “taking Tanzania 
to middle income country status and eradicate poverty” the strategies in place were 
insufficient. Instead “the planning efforts [of the FYDP] capitalize on the idea that 
‘business as usual’ attitude will not surmount these challenges [of Vision 2025]” 
(URT, 2011: ii-iii). In the opinion of the drafters of the FYDP (the government) 
something new and different to the MKUKUTA was needed: “MKUKUTA, though 
designed as an implementation strategy with broader outcomes, it fell short in terms 
of prioritisation of development issues and laying out specific strategic interventions 
to realize the objectives of Vision 2025” (Ibid.: 2-3). In fact, the “Poverty Reduction 
Strategies (PRS) were adopted as a safety net for the poor, which in the absence of 
Five Year Development Plans, became the framework to implement the Vision” 
(Ibid., authors italics). 
 
																																								 																				




There is no doubt that the FYDP is the primary document in the government’s 
approach to development and poverty reduction. When the previous President Dr JM 
Kikwete (2005 – 2015) spoke about ending extreme poverty, he highlighted the 
strategies of the FYDP, not the MKUKUTA.4 Two aspects of the FYDP are worth 
highlighting in order to understand how the FYDP also expresses the government’s 
approach to social protection: how the Vision 2025 narrates the challenges facing 
Tanzania, and how the FYDP reflects a productivist strategy in “realising the 
Country’s aspirations as stipulated in the Development Vision”.5 I elaborate on these 
two aspects in the following. 
 
The work on the Development Vision 2025 started under President Mkapa in 1995 
and was unveiled in 2000. The Vision was developed through discussions with 
domestic stakeholders including “Honourable Members of Parliament, all political 
parties, leaders of various religious denominations, women and youth organisations, 
chambers of commerce and industry, farmers, professional associations, renowned 
personalities in our nation’s history and ordinary Tanzanians”.6 Hence, the Vision is 
a truly Tanzanian document although probably reflecting more the views of the 
political-economic elite than the broad Tanzanian population. 
 
The Vision highlights various impediments to development where the first is 
“Donor-Dependence Syndrome and a Dependent and Defeatist Development 
Mindset”. As elaborated:  
 
‘The mindset of the people of Tanzania and their leaders has succumbed 
to donor dependency and has resulted in an erosion of initiative and lack 
of ownership of the development agenda. [….] The mindset … has neither 
been supportive of hard work, ingenuity and creativity’ (URT, 2000: 8).  
 
In suggestion solutions to this state of affairs, the Vision suggests: 
 
‘The effective transformation of the mindset and culture to promote 
attitudes of self-development, community development, confidence and 
commitment to face development challenges and exploit every opportunity 
for the improvement of the quality of livelihood is of prime importance. 
The effective ownership of the development agenda coupled with the spirit 
																																								 																				
4 E.g. Keynote speech by President Dr J. M. Kikwete, at the USAID Forum on “Frontiers in 
Development: Ending Extreme Poverty”, 19 September 2014, Washington DC. 
5 Prime Minister Hon. M. P. Pinda, in opening speech at the “3rd Annual National Policy Dialogue” 
at Ubungo Plaza, Dar es Salaam, 26 January 2012. 




of self-reliance, at all societal levels, are major driving forces for the 
realization of the Vision. Tanzanians should learn to appreciate and 
honour hard work, creativity, professionalism and entrepreneurship’ 
(URT, 2000: 17; italics by author). 
 
In the analysis of the development of the conditional cash transfer programmes 
(Section 6), it is clear that issues of community development and self-reliance feature 
prominently. The political elite’s concern with the Tanzanian ‘mindset’ remains 
prominent. Thus, the new President Dr J. Magufuli has emphasised the main 
drawbacks in Tanzania as corruption, poor management, waste of public resources, 
and “a culture that encouraged laziness and did not reward hard work”.7 
 
The Vision’s overall aim is to transform Tanzania from a least developed country to 
a middle-income country by 2025 (URT, 2000). The government views the FYDP to 
be the formal implementation tool in meeting this aim. The objective “is to unleash 
Tanzania’s latent growth potentials […by] the targeting of strategic priority 
interventions to move Tanzania to a higher growth trajectory coupled with a shift 
from an Agriculture-Based to an Industry-Based economy”.8 Specific strategies 
include addressing infrastructural bottlenecks, increase the pool of skilled labour, 
improve the business environment, and enhance productivity in agriculture.9 Clearly, 
the focus is on engineering productivity and enabling pro-poor growth. Any 
strategies aimed at the poor relate to “attracting investments, particularly in areas 
where the poor are more involved” (URT, 2011: 10) and therefore any growth 
strategy including the poor “must involve substantial growth of agricultural 
productivity and allow most of the rural population to benefit from such growth 
through selling the increased produce domestic and export markets” (Ibid.: 17). 
 
To sum up, the Tanzanian leaders’ approach to development and poverty reduction 
prioritises growth and productivity and less so protective interventions. The 
government acknowledges the importance of the poverty reduction strategy papers 
(MKUKUTA I and II) and international development agencies maintain some 
substantial influence through these policy documents, specifically in the policy areas 
where they are the main funders. However, the actual and final policy decisions sits 
with the president, key ministers and high-level public officials. The lines between 
																																								 																				
7 Speech by President Dr J. Magufuli at the inauguration of the 11th Parliament as cited in The 
Citizen, “Magufuli: My Priorities”, 21 November 2015. 
8 Prime Minister Hon. M. P. Pinda, in opening speech at the “3rd Annual National Policy Dialogue” 
at Ubungo Plaza, Dar es Salaam, 26 January 2012. 
9 Keynote speech by President Dr J. M. Kikwete, at the USAID Forum on “Frontiers in 




the CCM party and the state are blurred, and despite factions within the ruling party 
and increased political leverage of politicians at the local level, there is agreement 
among political observers that the core of the ruling CCM government control policy 
making in a centralised and top-down manner (Booth et al., 2014; Hoffman, 2013; 
Lofchie, 2014; Therkildsen & Bourgouin, 2012). Consequently, the policy 
perspectives by the top leaders as outlined here carries through to the different 
bureaucracies and implementing institutions working on developing specific social 
protection strategies.  Considering the overall aim of the Vision 2025 and the FYDP, 
social protection measures appear of lesser importance than productive strategies and 
there may have been less urgency in pushing for an overall framework. Certainly, as 
we shall see in the following, the process of development a National Social 
Protection Framework has been rather slow.  
 
 
4. National Social Protection Framework 
 
The process of developing an overarching framework to coordinate various social 
protection efforts in Tanzania has been quite long and is at the time of writing still 
not complete. The drawn-out process reflects an institutional battle between key 
Ministries, where the Ministry of Labour has moved more into the shadows behind 
the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance. The issue of dividing 
institutional responsibility also illustrate the move from a narrower and more 
compartmental concept of social security to a broader notion of social protection, 
which include more areas of engagement and hence require the inclusion of a broader 
range of institutions. The following narrative starts at the turn to the new Millennium 
when, as elsewhere, poverty reduction became the dominant development goal. 
  
In 2003, the government enacted the National Social Security Policy under the 
Ministry of Labour, Youth Development and Sports. This process had started in 2001 
and was done in consultation with a range of stakeholders (URT, 2003). The 
document’s definition of social security is in line with the ILO conceptualisation of 
social security being a three-tier system consisting of 1) social assistance, which are 
non-contributory assistance to poor and vulnerable groups; 2) mandatory schemes, 
which are contributory insurance payments through employment; and 3) private 
savings, as in voluntary savings schemes for retirement and insurance against events 
such as ill health and loss of income. Stated objectives include to:  
 
‘Widen the scope and coverage of social security services to all citizens; 




through improved quality and quantity of benefits offered; […and] 
Establish a social security structure that is consistent with the ILO 
standards but with due regard to the socio-economic situation in the 
country’ (URT, 2003: 12).  
 
By mid-2000s, the problem of the fragmentation and limited scope of social 
protection in Tanzania was increasingly recognised. Two developments were set in 
motion that, at least initially, had the Ministry of Labour in a central role. First, in 
2008, the Social Security (Regulatory) Authority Act was enacted, which set the 
ground for establishing the Social Security Regulatory Agency (SSRA) in 2010 
(URT, 2009). The SSRA falls under the Ministry of Labour and its primary role is to 
harmonise and regulate the social security schemes in order to extent coverage (UN, 
nd). In the beginning, the agency received funding and technical assistance from the 
ILO and the World Bank, but now it only gets limited external funding.10 Although 
the agency sees itself to have the mandate to cover all aspects of social security, 
including social assistance,11 the agency primarily works to improve the legal 
framework, access to and coverage of social insurance schemes.12 
 
The second development was the setting up of a Social Protection Working Group 
around 2007-08, which worked towards developing a National Social Protection 
Framework (NSPF) to coordinate social protection efforts more broadly.13 The 
Working Group was co-chaired by the Ministries of Finance and Labour together 
with UNICEF14 and worked in consultation with a variety of stakeholders from 
government, civil society and international doors. In October 2008, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs (not the Ministry of Labour) published a final draft of 
the NSPF. In this document, social protection is defined: 
 
‘in a comprehensive manner to include traditional family and community 
support structures, and interventions by state and non-state actors that 
support individuals, households and communities to prevent, manage, and 
overcome the risks threatening their present and future security and well-
being, and to embrace opportunities for their development and for social 
and economic progress in Tanzania’ (URT, 2008: 1). 
																																								 																				
10 Interview with senior official at SSRA 17 April 2015.  
11Ibid. 
12 Interview with Irene Isaka, Director General of Social Securities Regulatory Authority in 
Tanzania Invest 14 January 2014. 
13 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014, and senior researcher at REPOA 
29 April 2014. 




With the draft NSPF document, one could say that the ground work was now done 
to commit “the country to a stronger approach to social protection, including social 
transfers” (Shepherd et al., 2013: 190-91). However, in the years that followed the 
draft document was not enacted by the government. As late as mid-2014, social 
protection stakeholders that had been part of the process of developing the NSPF 
were unsure what the status of the NSPF was.15 The Ministry of Finance was 
regarded to be championing the process, but it was speculated that the NSPF had 
“fallen victim between two elephants fighting” in which the less resourceful Ministry 
of Labour was losing ground to the Ministry of Finance.16 
 
Later in 2014 and 2015, there was a push to get the NSPF enacted. A Task Force 
(consisting of MoF, TASAF, SSRA among others) under the leadership of the Office 
of the Prime Minister was established by government to finalise the framework, and 
according to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the government 
was expecting to have the Framework approved by June 2015.17 The UN agencies, 
as long-term partners of the process, have been keen to support a move towards a 
coherent social protection framework and specifically in mid-2015 they pushed to 
assist the Task Force in developing a final framework that could be approved by the 
cabinet before the election in October 2015. The support included technical 
assistance and funding of analyses, stakeholder consultations and consultants.18 
However, the NSPF did not get approved by cabinet before the elections and at the 
time of writing its fate with the new government is uncertain. 
 
Still, social protection efforts continue. The Task Force within the Office of the 
Prime Minister provides the overall coordination, but it is the Social Protection 
Working Group, co-chaired by the Ministry of Finance and UNICEF that meets 
regularly and keeps oversight over social protection issues and programmes (UN, 
nd). The Ministry of Finance is thus centrally placed in defining the specific path that 
social protection efforts in Tanzania take. The involvement of resourceful and 
coordinating ministries in social protection (as in the Ministry of Finance and the 
Office of the Prime Minister19) also reflects the broadening of policy areas 
considered to be important in addressing income insecurity. Social protection include 
																																								 																				
15 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014, and senior researcher at REPOA 
29 April 2014. 
16 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014. 
17 Presentation by Dr S. Likwelile, Min of Finance, 17 December 2014, International Conference 
in Arusha. 
18 Interviews and conversations with officials at ILO and UNDP. 





social security as regulated by the Ministry of Labour and the SSRA, social safety 
nets in cash or in kind, the delivery of welfare services by the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare, vulnerable groups and livelihood programmes and so on. Over time, 
concepts like productive livelihoods, community development, and self-reliance 
have become more firmly included in approaches to social protection responses (e.g. 
the TASAF programmes as discussed in Section 6), which also reflects the 
governments approach to development and poverty reduction as discussed in Section 
3. 
 
The central role played by the Ministry of Finance in social protection is well 
exemplified by the big international conference entitled Social Protection: Building 
Effective and Sustainable Systems for Equitable Growth, which the Ministry 
facilitated with support from the UN, UNICEF, ILO, UNAIDS and EPRI (Economic 
Policy Research Institute) in Arusha, 15-17 December 2014. The conference was 
attended by several ministries, implementing agencies (including SSRA and 
TASAF), donor agencies, domestic and international NGOs, and social protection 
experts and researchers.20 The overall purpose of the conference was arguably to 
gather domestic support for the upscaling of the conditional cash transfer programme 
(see section 6). However, the conference was also an opportunity for the Ministry of 
Finance to cement itself as the main promotor of social protection in Tanzania. 
  
The conference ended ceremoniously with the Minister of Finance, Hon. Saada 
Mkuya Salum, signing the Arusha Declaration on Social Protection in Tanzania. In 
itself a pompous name, given that the Arusha Declaration of 1967 refers to 
Tanzania’s famous statement of African socialism, Ujaama, the Declaration of 2014 
was not an outcome of elaborate debate at the conference, but rather a document 
drafted by key stakeholders and then presented to the audience. The declaration states 
to be “A guide to Action: Towards a nationally owned social protection system for 
the poor, vulnerable and marginalized” (URT, 2014). The declaration holds a 
promise:  
 
‘Tanzania reaffirms her commitment to adopt the National Policy 
Framework for Social Protection […] with the aim of undertaking reforms 
of existing social protection measures to reach the poor and vulnerable 
better. The framework shall progressively extend coverage of social 
protection measures to all’ (URT, 2014).  
 
																																								 																				




It is argued to be in line with the overall development plan (FYDP) and poverty 
reduction strategy (MKUKUTA): “This national commitment aligns pro-poor goals 
of the key social sectors like health, water, education and those of social protection 
programmes like TASAF” (Ibid.). 
 
The Declaration is not a legal document gazetted by the Government and it is not a 
replacement of the National Social Protection Framework. Probably it can be 
regarded as a statement of the government’s commitment to social protection. 
Another interesting outcome of the 2014 Conference was that the Minister of Finance 
stated that there is a “political will for social protection, particularly on implementing 
universal pension for elders”.21 She elaborated that the Government was at the initial 
faces towards introducing a pension system for the elderly. That it was the Ministry 
of Finance who made this announcement might be seen as a blow to the Ministry of 
Labour, who had otherwise been the main government entity involved in promoting 
the idea of a social pension for the elderly, as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
5. Old Age Pension 
 
Initially, during the 2000s, the idea of a non-contributory old age pension was 
promoted by international NGOs, the ILO and some international donors. Only later, 
did the Ministry of Labour also seriously look into the matter. However, in the end, 
the Ministry of Finance made a promise to introduce a social pension for the elderly, 
although it is still unclear whether this promise will turn into actual delivery. 
 
According to one study in the early 2000s, “the elderly are the least supported” with 
only the International NGO, HelpAge, paying attention to “the impoverishing forces 
facing the elderly” (Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003: 69). It was with the assistance 
of HelpAge and REPSSI (Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative) that the 
KwaWazee pension fund was started in the Nshamba villages in the Muleba District, 
north-western Tanzania, at the end of 2003. The project initially started small-scale 
with the intention of learning about the lived realities of elderly people and to identify 
ways to respond to their needs. However, as more funds became available, 
KwaWazee developed into a cash transfer programme with the aim of providing poor 
and vulnerable people over the age of 60, including those caring for children without 
parents, with regular cash payments in the form of pensions and child benefits. The 
programme expanded to other villages in the Muleba district and by 2007, there were 
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nearly 600 pensioners who received a monthly cash transfer of TSh 6,000 (US$ 5) 
plus an additional child benefit of TSh 3,000 for each (grand)child cared for 
(Hofmann et al., 2008; Kessy, 2014).  
 
Although the KwaWazee project has remained rather small scale in reach, the project 
has played an important role in documenting and evaluating the impact of a regular 
pension cash transfers for the well-being of pensioners and their families. An 
evaluation of the project was published in 2008 with a strong justification of its value 
for policymaking: “There is very little documentation in Tanzania on social pensions 
or social assistance for older people. Thus, the KwaWazee scheme can be regarded 
as a step towards the introduction of more such provision in Tanzania” (Hofmann et 
al., 2008: xiv). In line with other studies of social cash transfers elsewhere (e.g. 
UNDP & ILO, 2011), the evaluation report documents a range of positive impacts of 
pensions on older people. Thus, to highlight a few aspects, the regular pension 
payments improve the household economy so that the pensioners are better prepared 
for crisis such as drought and illness and they are more self-reliant with the biggest 
parts of the cash transfer being spent on basic food and basic needs (salt, soap and 
shoes). There were also notable improvements in the overall health status and 
psychosocial wellbeing of pensioners, just as children in homes receiving cash 
transfers experienced better material and social wellbeing. Following the evaluation, 
the report recommends the consideration of a universal pension scheme (Hoffman et 
al., 2008). 
 
The civil society organisations involved with the KwaWazee project have continued 
to put the importance of an old age pension on the agenda. Other stakeholders have 
added their voices too. In 2006, the Department of International Development 
(DFID) of the UK Government funded an ILO-led feasibility study. The study 
provided a micro-simulations for Tanzania and Senegal to test different social policy 
options and their potential impact on poverty at household levels. For Tanzania, it 
was argued in the report that a combination of universal old age pension and child 
benefit “would achieve a reduction in poverty rates of 35 per cent, with even more 
substantial effects for individuals living in households with children and elderly (a 
drop of 46 per cent), which face the highest poverty risk” (Gassmann & Behrendt, 
2006: vi). This study of micro-simulations built on an earlier ILO study (Pal et al., 
2005) that assessed affordability of social protection from a macroeconomic 
perspective and concluded that a basic social benefit package would be affordable in 
most African countries, if governments were willing to provide sufficient budgetary 





The ILO was also involved, when in 2008 the Ministry of Labour, Employment and 
Youth Development undertook a Social Protection Expenditure Performance 
Review. In this study, it was highlighted that the feasibility of a universal non-
contributory old age pension should be investigated as there was a high rate of 
poverty among households containing older people (ILO, 2008). Based on that 
recommendation, the Ministry of Labour, in collaboration with HelpAge 
International, and with funding from the German Federal Ministry of Economic, 
embarked on a study to assess the feasibility of introducing a universal old age 
pension. The study offers an analysis of the costs, fiscal sustainability and financing 
option for an old age pension and included inputs from a broad range of government, 
parastatal, non-governmental and private institutions. In the report, it is argued that  
...achieving old age income security is key to realising Tanzania’s national 
development potential. Implementation of a universal social pension is both 
technically possible and fiscally sustainable and would contribute to achieving a 
wide range of national development objectives. The social pension represents a cost 
effective investment in broad-based social and economic development and would be 
a major step towards achieving the rights set out in the Tanzanian Constitution 
(Ministry of Labour, 2010: 8).  
 
Around the same time, the independent research institution REPOA published a 
report, which analysed the material well-being and living arrangements of 
Tanzanians 60 years of age and older and assessed the affordability of a universal 
pension. In line with the report from the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth 
Development, this report also argued that an old age pension would substantially 
decrease poverty – that it could “lift over 3 million Tanzanians out of poverty” and 
that it would be affordable (Mboghoina & Osberg, 2010). 
 
In the years that followed, HelpAge and its partners in the KwaWazee project 
continued to lobby for an old age pension and to provide evidence on its value, for 
instance with an evaluation report published in 2014 (Heslop & Hofmann, 2014). 
Furthermore, the SSRA under the Ministry of Labour was tasked with running 
additional feasibility studies and designing the programme.22 Hence, the 
announcement in 2014 to look into introducing a pension was maybe not entirely 
unexpected. However, with the push to find funding and implement the PSSN (see 
the next section) there was uncertainty among donors and civil society as to the 
government’s actual commitment, or at least ability to implement the programme.23 
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As one donor mentioned, since they had already committed to fund the PSSN, they 
would not be willing to fund yet another social protection programme – even if they 




6. Conditional Cash Transfers 
 
Since 2013, the Tanzanian government has worked to implement the nation-wide 
Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) programme, which is a conditional cash 
transfer (including elements of public works and livelihood enhancement) targeting 
the extreme poor (calculated as about ten percent of the population of 50 million). 
The ambition set in 2013 was to reach at least 1 million food insecure households 
(TASAF, 2015). As described in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, the road to the PSSN started 
with small community development projects implemented by TASAF (Tanzania 
Social Action Fund). Thus, the PSSN has its roots in traditional community-based 
projects aimed at improving livelihoods and lifting people out of poverty. The World 
Bank has been the main driver of introducing the conditional cash transfer 
programme. Increasingly, it has built a strong alliance with its implementing partner, 
TASAF, and also the Ministry of Finance. The strong productivist notion in the 
PSSN is much in line with the government’s approach to development and poverty 
reduction as outlined in the FYDP in 2011.  
 
The PSSN is the biggest cash transfer programme in Tanzania and its development 
is the focus of this section. It is nevertheless important to note that during the same 
period (2000-2015), the World Food Programme (WFP) moved from strategies of 
food aid to food assistance, which has included the implementation and expansion of 
a food-for-asset programme to cover annually 250,000 beneficiaries (WFP, 2011).25 
The WFP has had its presence in Tanzania since the mid-1960s where it has delivered 
emergency food aid to reduce chronic food insecurity; until the turn to the new 
millennium, food programmes were the primary modality of delivering emergency 
relief across most of Africa (Seekings, 2014). However, despite decades of delivering 
food supplies to affected individuals, food aid has achieved little in terms of reducing 
chronic food insecurity (Devereux, 2012). Thus, food assistance has been introduced 
to represent a new philosophy in supporting food security efforts in which food or 
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cash is provided in ways that seek to build human capacity, community assets and 
production in order to enhance long-term resilience (Harvey et al., 2010).26 The food-
for-asset programme falls within this philosophy as the programme seeks to 
encourage low-income food-insecure households to participate in activities that can 
contribute to long-term food security. As explained: “Food will be an incentive to 
participate in asset-creation activities and participants will receive take-home rations 
during the lean period when access to food is poor and prices are high” (WFP, 2011: 
4). 
 
Apart from offering food instead of cash, the food-for-asset programme is similar to 
the public works element of the PSSN where the focus is also on incentivising 
beneficiaries to build community assets in return for benefits. Yet the TASAF and 
WFP programmes have run more in parallel than in a coordinated manner, and it is 
only recently that the two agencies have started to discuss how better to align their 
programmes. From the perspective of a WFP official, the World Food Programme 
has not always seen themselves as fitting neatly into the policy box labelled ‘social 
protection’. In their overall strategy design, the food-for-asset falls under climate 
change, the school feeding programme under education, and the nutrition 
programmes under nutrition/health. Still, WFP officials have shared lessons on 
relevant pilot programmes with TASAF (such as a small cash transfer programme to 
mothers) and were also consulted in the design of the PSSN.27 As we have seen in 
the cases of the national social protection framework, and the old age pension, the 
development of policies involves a whole range of stakeholders. This is also the case 
with the development of the PSSN, as we shall see in the following, although it has 
primarily been driven by the World Bank in collaboration with TASAF and the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
6.1 From community development to CCT pilot 
 
In 2000, the government established a programme to “facilitate improvements in 
socio-economic infrastructure in rural and peri-urban communities under TASAF” 
(Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003: 35). The programme falls under the President’s 
Office and was formed as “part of the Government of Tanzania’s strategy for 
reducing poverty and improving livelihoods by stimulating economic activity at the 
community level” (Evans et al., 2014: 10). In wording, the programme falls in line 
with the government’s Vision 2025 in which dissatisfaction with previous attempts 
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at rural development and poverty reduction is expressed, and in which the idea of 
self-development is promoted to effectuate transformation (URT, 2000). At this 
stage, TASAF was more akin to a community development programme rather than 
simply a cash transfer programme. The main purpose was to oversee smaller projects, 
which were decided, managed and implemented by the communities; such projects 
included the construction and improvement of community social services (basic 
health-care facilities and schools) and infrastructural assets. Poor and vulnerable 
households were identified by community leaders together with TASAF officials, 
and targeted households could become part of public works programme (receiving 
income for work on community assets) or other smaller income generating projects 
(Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003; Evans et al., 2014). 
 
TASAF I ran from 2000 to 2005 and was then followed by TASAF II, which 
continued in much the same way with the aim of “empowering communities to 
access opportunities so that they can request, implement and monitor subprojects that 
contribute to improved livelihoods” (TASAF, 2008: v). TASAF II covered 121 local 
communities on Tanzania mainland and supported the improvement of access to and 
use of basic social services and assisted food insecure households and vulnerable 
individuals through public works subprojects and income generating activities 
(TASAF, 2008). According to the UN, TASAF I and II “achieved impressive results 
in facilitating community access to social services through infrastructure projects 
such as schools, health facilities and water points reaching 7.3 million people in 
TASAF I and 16.1 million in TASAF II” (UN, nd). 
 
During TASAF II, the idea of a conditional cash transfer programme took form. The 
World Bank has been the primary funder of TASAF since its inception, and from 
around 2005 the Bank organised international workshops and exchange travels so 
that TASAF staff and other key stakeholders could learn about social protection 
interventions and programmes elsewhere.28 With the assistance of the World Bank, 
the TASAF started to design a cash transfer system around 2006-07. The basic 
elements of the suggested pilot programme is similar to many other World Bank 
supported cash transfers in the Global South (Hall, 2007). Thus, an initial pilot 
project should run in a few districts (with already identified control group 
communities); the project should – as was already the case within the TASAF 
programmes – target the poorest and most vulnerable groups who should receive a 
small regular cash transfer based on certain conditions. According to TASAF 
officials, conditionality was regarded as important politically in a context where the 
idea of co-responsibility as a positive behavioural attributes features prominently, 
																																								 																				




whereas it is feared that cash transfer programmes could otherwise be perceived as 
handouts.29  
  
In one way, the suggested conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme differed to 
programmes elsewhere that have tended to be managed and implemented centrally. 
In Tanzania, the targeting of beneficiaries and the monitoring of the programme were 
to be done at the community level with a strong influence of the people living within 
the community. Thus, CB (community-based) was added to the abbreviated name of 
the proposed project to be CB-CCT. In the proposed design, it was suggested that 
the CB-CCT pilot programme would work most cost effectively if building on the 
already existing structures that TASAF had built in the communities that had 
benefited from previous programmes.30 The government agreed to the project and it 
was started in 2009 with the first cash transfer payments done in January 2010 (Evans 
et al., 2014). 
 
Three districts, that had been part of previous TASAF programmes, were selected 
for the pilot project: Bagamoyo (70 km north of Dar es Salaam), Kibaha (35 km 
north-west of Dar), and Chamwino (500 km west from Dar). The pilot covered 5000 
households in 40 communities within these three districts, with another 40 
communities serving as control groups (Alaedini, 2013). Community organisations 
were heavily involved in various activities related to the implementation of the 
programme, including identifying potential beneficiaries, explaining the programme 
to community members, and in “applying peer pressure for compliance with the 
program conditions” (Evans et al., 2014: 11).  
 
The process of targeting was designed to ensure community involvement and 
commitment:  
 
‘Targeting was done by Community Management Committees (CMCs) 
under the oversight of the Village Council (VC), the local governing body, 
and with the endorsement of the Village Assembly (VA), which consists 
of all adults who live in the village. The CMC was democratically elected 
by potential beneficiaries and endorsed by the VA. Targeting was done 
using screening forms designed to identify vulnerable children and elderly 
people based on […] criteria, which were defined by the communities 
themselves’ (Evans et al., 2014: 14). 
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The criteria for identifying vulnerable children and elderly people related to poor 
health, being without caregivers and experiencing severe deprivation. Beneficiary 
households were paid bimonthly. The amount ranged from a minimum of $12 to a 
maximum of $36; these figures were based on the food poverty line and depended 
on the number of people in the household. Conditions attached to the cash transfer 
related to ensuring that children go to primary school and that both children and the 
elderly visit health clinics. The idea behind the conditionalities was to foster long-
term improvements in health and education indicators among the beneficiaries. 
Whether beneficiaries were living up to the conditions were monitored every four 
month through a process that included TASAF and the Community Management 




6.2 From Conditional Cash Transfers to Productive 
Social Safety Nets 
 
The pilot conditional cash transfer in Tanzania built on community development 
projects as implemented by TASAF and with the bulk of funding from the World 
Bank. The projects had a specific focus on poverty reduction and included a strong 
emphasis on supporting beneficiaries to be capable of helping themselves and escape 
the poverty trap. The ideas of productivity and co-responsibility has remained strong 
elements in developing the policy design as the CB-CCT moved to become a 
nationwide programme (the PSSN). These ideas are also supported by the 
government’s overall development strategy as reflected in the FYDP, which was also 
produced during this period. 
 
As the CB-CCT was a pilot project, monitoring and evaluation was of course 
essential components. Some documentation are internal reports developed by or in 
consultation with TASAF for its own internal use and in sharing with its government 
counterparts and international development partners.31 However, there are also 
publicly available reports and documentation that have been shared more widely. In 
the following, it is described how the World Bank and TASAF have organized events 
and disseminated reports in order to gain support for the upscaling of the conditional 
cash transfer programme. 
 
Already in June 2010, the World Bank and TASAF organized an international 
conference for participants across the global south to engage in a Public Works 
																																								 																				




Learning Forum. TASAF were to show case its public works programmes as 
implemented in TASAF I and II and the forum would engage in sharing knowledge 
and expertise among World Bank officials and their country-level counterparts and 
to “catalyse improved understanding and know-how on the role of public work 
programs as part [of] national safety net and social protection agendas”.32 
 
In 2011, the World Bank published a report on Tanzania with the sub-title Options 
for a National Productive Safety Net Program. The report “explores the role safety 
nets and transfers can play in reducing poverty more rapidly in Tanzania” (World 
Bank, 2011: i). It is not an evaluation of the ongoing CB-CCT programme, but 
instead engages itself with the question of how a social safety net system is not just 
a mechanism to reduce poverty and improve human capabilities (as in the CB-CCT), 
but also a means to increase productivity of beneficiaries so that they can help 
themselves escape poverty. In advocating for conditional cash transfers with a 
‘productivist’ element, the report suggests: 
 
‘…the primary focus of reducing poverty clearly needs to remain on re-
engineering growth to reach poor Tanzanians. This means raising the 
productivity of subsistence agriculture, improving markets and access, 
investing in education and infrastructure, and encouraging smallholder 
cash cropping and small business. But judicious transfers to the poor can 
complement these efforts and hasten reduction of extreme poverty. A 
central role of safety net transfers is to equip the poor to participate more 
fully in this growth process, and to bridge ‘gaps’ that are preventing them 
from realizing potential income gains. “Smart” safety nets can increase 
their productivity (by building human and physical capital); allow the poor 
to take on higher-risk, higher-return activities (for example using 
fertilizer); and increase the returns to their labour (examples include small 
cash transfers that allow women to undertake petty trading; or subsistence 
farmers to buy food, and thus shift some of their land to cash crops)’ 
(World Bank, 2011: 54). 
 
In conversations with TASAF officials, they have emphasised that the idea of 
‘productivity’ was important in building political support for an upscaling of the CCT 
programme.33 This emphasis seems understandable given the political leaders’ focus 
on ‘unleashing Tanzania’s latent growth potential’ as discussed in Section 3. 
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Gathering evidence from the pilot was another important aspect in ‘selling’ the 
programme. Although only published in 2014, a World Bank led evaluation report 
provided important information about the impact of the CCT pilot, with a mid-term 
review in 2011, draft versions of the report and presentations of key findings being 
available earlier (Evans et al., 2014).34 The report is extensive and thorough in its 
assessment of impacts on beneficiary communities, which can be summarized as 
follows:  
 
‘On the whole, the community-based CCT program led to improved 
outcomes in both health and education. Households used the resources to 
invest in livestock, in children’s shoes, in insurance, and—for the poorest 
households— in increased savings. This suggests that the households 
focused on reducing risk and on improving their livelihoods rather than 
principally on increasing consumption. There is also evidence that the 
project had positive effects on community cohesion’ (Evans et al., 2014: 
8). 
 
Based on the experiences of the TASAF I and II (including the CB-CCT pilot), their 
evaluations and reports as exemplified above, the government decided in 2013 to 
design and implement a countrywide Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) 
programme (UN, nd). The PSSN was argued to be “fundamentally a conditional cash 
transfer program, complemented by a seasonal intensive public works labor 
program” (Morisset, 2013b: 42), which follows well in line with the CCT pilot and 
the public works aspects of TASAF I and II. Thus, at this point, the Government 
committed itself to the PSSN as part of its overall strategy to overcome the 
persistence of extreme poverty in the country. This move was widely championed by 
the Department of Poverty Eradication within the Ministry of Finance.35 Incidentally, 
the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance was previously the Director of 
TASAF.36 
 
Even though there was a decision to implement the PSSN, the actual implementation 
and upscale of the programme country-wide required additional funding. The World 
Bank had been the primary funder of TASAF I and II, including the CB-CCT, but 
was now looking to the government to turn its initial support into actual budgetary 
commitment and to other donors to be co-funders. In December 2013, the World 
Bank launched the report Tanzanian Economic Update 2013 at an event attended by 
																																								 																				
34 At least one earlier version of the report has been circulated and researchers also presented their 
initial findings. 
35 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014. 




government officials and donor partners. In the report the World Bank specifically 
promoted the idea of “lessening extreme poverty by transferring cash directly to the 
most vulnerable groups” and advocated that “[t]he scaling up of this program [CCT 
to PSSN] to achieve national coverage could result in significant reductions in 
extreme poverty without excessively high expenditure” (Morisset, 2013b: iii; x-xi). 
World Bank officials challenged the Tanzanian government “to seriously invest in 
social protection if it really aims to combat poverty”,37 and sought to provide good 
arguments for why the government should “give money to Tanzania’s poor”.38 
  
Another important event that can be seen as a clear attempt by the Ministry of 
Finance to get domestic political support for the PSSN is the aforementioned 
international conference in Arusha 15-17 December 2014. A range of Ministries 
related to social protection broadly were represented by their Deputy Ministers, 
including the ministries of Education and Vocational Training; Community 
Development; Health and Social Welfare; State, Prime Minister’s Office of Regional 
Administration and Local Government; Home Affairs; and Labour and Employment 
(only the Permanent Secretary).39 The Deputy Ministers were given the tasks of 
chairing different sessions and as such, their active participation was ensured. The 
programme included a wide variety of presentations on experiences of social 
protection programmes internationally, regionally, and within Tanzania. Although 
there were presentations on categorical pensions schemes such as exists in Lesotho 
and as implemented by KwaWazee in Kagera region, the majority of presentations 
focused on targeted and conditional cash transfers, including experiences of 
combining these with public works. Listening to all the presentations, the main 
message coming across was hard to miss: that giving cash transfers to the extreme 
poor has a range of positive impacts that goes well beyond the costs of such 
programmes. This is of course in line with the experiences across the Global South 
in the pass 10 to 15 years, but it is also noteworthy that potentially controversial 
issues were ignored, such as the questionable impact of conditionalities and the 
challenges of targeting in countries where the majority is poor and administrative 
capacity is limited. 
 
There were some, who felt that the World Bank and TASAF were glossing over 
possible difficulties in the pilot programme and potential challenges in upscaling. As 
one civil society activist said: “it is all praise and I don’t believe that it [the pilot 
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programme] didn’t encounter any problems”.40 Some donors were also not 
particularly keen on certain aspects of the PSSN, particularly the use of 
conditionalities.41 Nevertheless, DFID and SIDA (Swedish International 
Development Cooperation) have joined as the primary donors alongside the World 
Bank. The UN bodies (operating under the UNDAP – United Nations Development 
Assistance Plan) also support the PSSN programme on the fringes with technical 
assistance and training to strengthen the capacity of TASAF and other implementing 
institutions.42 Some of the main rationales put forward by the donors to support PSSN 
was that this was a programme already in existence and that the government had 
made it clear that it wanted the PSSN as the main poverty reducing social protection 
strategy.43 The programme furthermore fitted with overall donor strategies of 
reducing poverty, improving education (especially for girls) and contributing to 
employment and income security among the poorest.44 
 
As should be clear by now, the road to the PSSN has been driven by the World Bank 
together with TASAF. Through the implementation of TASAF I and II, and CB-CCT 
pilot, the two entities have built a foundation on which it seemed only natural that 
TASAF should implement the country-wide programme. The nature of the 
programme, with elements such as conditionality and public works/productive 
economic activities, fits well with the World Bank’s approach to social protection as 
minimum safety nets that should assist beneficiaries to escape poverty (Hall 2007). 
TASAF officials themselves use a language akin to that of the World Bank. They 
emphasise that beneficiaries should ‘graduate’ out of the programme within three 
years; they regard social pensions as problematic and inefficient as you cannot 
‘graduate’ and because a universal pension will also include non-poor beneficiaries; 
and they see conditionalities as essential in ensuring that beneficiaries prioritise 
health and education and in building political support.45 With the emphasis on 
productive self-reliance and co-responsibility rather than protective entitlements and 
rights, they have also been able to ensure that the PSSN fits with the development 
approach laid out in the FYDP. TASAF officials are, not surprisingly, passionate 
about the PSSN, which has placed them centrally in the Government’s poverty 
reducing efforts. From running quite small-scale community projects, TASAF has – 
together with the World Bank – pursued the idea that productive social safety nets is 
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43 Interview with official from DFID 21 April 2015. 
44 Email correspondence with Official at the Swedish Embassy 10-13 April 2014. 




the obvious choice in terms of social protection, and TASAF has become the main 





Policy-making is rarely a smooth process, where overarching frameworks define 
specific policy designs so that they together form a coherent whole. Instead, as the 
case of social protection policy development in Tanzania shows, policy-making can 
be a lengthy, incremental and somewhat haphazard process, where different actors 
put forward their ideas and try to promote their preferred policy design. In this 
process, a range of factors have been determining in defining the social protection 
path taken in Tanzania. 
 
Changing concepts: Internationally, there has been a move away from using the 
traditional concept of social security to embrace instead the broader notion of social 
protection. Social protection includes not only social insurance and social assistance, 
but is open to a variety of policy areas that can improve livelihoods and reduce 
poverty. This trend is reflected in policy developments in Tanzania. The TASAF I 
and TASAF II projects as they were implemented in the 2000s were primarily 
poverty alleviating community projects and did not as such fit the classical 
understanding of social assistance. However, as these projects developed into the 
PSSN programme, the element of social assistance (cash transfer) is firmly included 
while the programme has also retained some of the original ideas of productive 
livelihoods and community developments, which are now regarded as natural parts 
of a social protection strategy. With the move from social security to social 
protection, the Ministry of Labour and its social security agency (SSRA) have lost 
some of their previous centrality in this field, as social security (generally narrowed 
down to social insurance) is only one aspect of social protection. Instead, the field of 
actors that can play a role has expanded so that it requires coordination at a higher 
level (Office of the Prime Minister) and include partners that before did not 
necessarily see themselves as social protection actors, such as the World Food 
Programme. 
 
Institutional ownership: It is plausible that the process of developing an overarching 
national social protection framework has stalled in part because different institutions 
are anxious to maintain or gain a prominent role in a policy area that has received 
increasing attention amongst donors. The Ministry of Labour has been in the driving 




old age pension. However, the Ministry seems to have been bypassed somewhat by 
the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office, which are positioned in 
more coordinating roles of social protection. Particularly, the Ministry of Finance 
has taken on itself to promote the PSSN and also announced the introduction of the 
old age pension. Implementing agencies will also naturally seek to promote 
themselves. TASAF has been successful in moving itself from implementing 
targeted community project and the pilot CCT to the rollout of the PSSN nationwide. 
It has helped TASAF to have the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank as 
resourceful partners. 
 
External actors: Particularly in low-income countries like Tanzania, international 
donor agencies have a prominent role in influencing policy. Although the ILO and 
international NGOs have promoted the idea of an old age pension, the World Bank 
has been most successful in supporting the move towards developing a conditional 
cash transfer programme. Whereas the other agencies have had limited funding, the 
World Bank have been able to fund the TASAF programmes and the CB-CCT pilot, 
which laid the groundwork for the PSSN. As part of this, they have also been able to 
support various events and workshops and the publication of reports, which have 
been used to successfully sell the PSSN programme to the government and other 
donors. 
 
Learning: Feasibility studies and impact evaluations have been important elements 
in defining social protection policies in Tanzania. TASAF and the World Bank have 
produced a constant flow of publications that have supported them in developing the 
PSSN and to garner support for the programme. International NGOs, the ILO, the 
Ministry of Labour and the SSRA have similarly promoted the idea of an old age 
pension through feasibility studies and evidence-based reports although maybe not 
quite as persuasively as the TASAF and the World Bank. Whether intentionally or 
not, the TASAF and the World Bank have also been able to sell the PSSN as a 
production focused programme, which fits well with the government’s overall 
development approach as defined in the Five-Year Development Plan. 
 
Timing: Status by the end of 2015 is that the PSSN programme has the go-ahead and 
is moving forward. The National Social Protection Framework was in the process of 
being finalised and the introduction of an old age pension had been announced. 
However, as Tanzania had its elections in October 2015 and a new President came 
in (although from the same party) the fate of these two policies are uncertain. 
Ministries are being restructured and some new actors coming in. Only time will tell 
whether these political changes will merely delay the processes set in motion or more 
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